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ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS IN SOVIET AZERBAUAN 
Bradford R. McGuinn 
Florida International University 
Introduction 
An Empire in decline is never a pretty sight. Its rulers 
indecisive, its institutions diminished and ridiculed, its legitimacy 
no longer self-evident, its power no longer feared: such a power 
becomes a danger to itself and the world within which it lives. As 
the sequels to the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires reveal such 
implosions occasion disorder and violence of an intensity to 
obscure whatever hopes attended their destruction. Might not this 
apply to Gorbachev's Soviet Union, the "Sick Man" ofEurasia? 1 
Or, is it that the USSR is a superpower in transition, a potentially 
dynamic international force capable of overcoming its maladies 
and divisions? 2 The Soviet future is dim and uncertain. All that 
may be safely said is that there can be no going back; powerful 
forces have been unleashed, ones which may deliver the USSR 
from its predicament or ensure its demise. Nowhere is this better 
symbolised than by the explosion of ethnic nationalist, and 
religious movements which have surfaced over the past several 
years. "Passions", Mikhail Gorbachev conceded, "are now run-
ning out of control". 3 Ethnonationalism has indeed resurfaced in 
the USSR. 
About this there should be little surprise. Yet, Sovietolo-
gists are not alone in their underestimation of the "subnational" 
level of analysis. Indeed, the changes in the Soviet Union pose a 
challenge equally to students of international relations. At first 
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sight, no incompatability would seem to exist between the disci-
pline of International Relations and the phenomenon of ethnic 
nationalism. After all, many of the more intractable and sanguine 
problems in world politics have ethnonationalism as their es-
sence, from Northern Ireland to Ethiopia, from Israel to Canada. 
Yet, ethnonationalism remains a factor with which the 
discipline has not adequately to come to terms. This is not an 
arbitrary lapse but rather a systematic bias, the result of a combi-
nation of intellectual prejudices. There has, first, been a central 
focus on the "nation-state" as the primary actor in world politics. 
Such a tendency is associated with Realist Theory much as it was 
with the early developmental speculations regarding "nation-
building".4 There has been, secondly, an equally intense focus on 
the "international level" of analysis emphasizing regional integra-
tion, world society, and international organizations. This has been 
the prediliction of the pluralist theorists. 5 One may point, thirdly, 
to the influence of globalist or Marxian theories which posit a 
vision of transcending concepts of class and competition among 
socio-economic systems.6 All of these perspectives share an 
analytical bias against the subnational forces of ethnicity and 
religion. But, this bias was in many ways inevitable. It merely 
reflected the general tendencies of modern Western thought: 
secular and melioristic; focused on commonalities rather than 
differences; integration rather than fragmentation, cooperation 
rather than conflict and, above all, on the power of transcending 
idea-systems and loyalties over "traditional" or "narrow" ones. 
A price was paid for this prejudice as the West watched, 
in powerless amazement, the ethnic and religious resurgence of 
the late 1970s and 1980s. And, now as the Twentieth Century 
nears its end one may observe not, as earlier assumed, the 
realization of universal comity informed by enlightened secular 
values but instead a spectacle of religious intolerence and eth-
nonationalist conflict. A more profound shock to the modernist 
sensibility could not have been imagined. 
It is the purpose of this essay to examine the reemergence 
of ethnonationalism in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan with 
specific emphasis on the affect it may have on international 
politics. This shall entail first an historical overview of Azer-
baijan, a discussion of its emergent "civil society" as well as its 
"conflict society", followed by some observations regarding the 
connections between Azerbaijani ethononationalism and 
internationalism. 
The Historical Evolution of Azerbaijan 
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"It is," Abulfaz Aliev of the Azerbaijani Popular Front 
asserted, "only a matter of time until Azerbaijan becomes an 
independent country." 7 This view, while by no means the domi-
nant one in the Republic goes, nevertheless, to the heart of the 
matter. What are the potentials for the rise of Azeri ethnonation-
alism and to what extent will it involve a move toward secession? 
A brief examination of the history of this troubled area reveals the 
problematic nature of this undertaking. 
Azerbaijan, the "land of fires", denotes a region sur-
rounded to the north by the Caucaus Mountains, to the east by the 
Caspian Sea, to the West by the Armenian Highlands, and to the 
South, by Iran. It is an area of great geopolitical significance, a 
corridor between Orient and Occident. 8 Its location and oil wealth 
made it the site of invasions and the focus of Russian, Turkish, and 
Persian imperial rivalries. 
Before the Russian conquests of the 19th Century, Azer-
baijan was ruled by a variety of Khanates which presided over a 
deeply fragmented realm. 9 In no way did "traditional" Azeri 
society furnish a sense of "national identity". 10 Such notions 
arrived only as part of a phenomena felt across the Muslim world 
during the late 19th and early 20th Centuries: the impact of the 
West.11 This was the central event in Azerbaijan's modem history. 
The triumph of the West meant the proliferation ofits ideas. These 
ideas, secular and activist could not but be subversive to the 
traditional societies of the East, challenging conventions and 
introducing hitherto forbidden possibilities, specifically in the 
pursuit of temporal millenium through the agency of politics. 12 
Azerbaijan, thus, underwent its "national awakening" at 
this time, concomitant with a host of other groups: Armenians, 
Jews, Kurds, and Arabs. The search for an ideologically contrived 
identity involved several general currents of thought. One was 
Pan-Islamism or Islamic Modernism. This was a hybrid doctrine, 
an attempt by theorists such as Jamal Afghani to srnthesize Islam 
with the Western ideological mode of thought. 1 A second was 
Pan Turkism or Turkish nationalism. Based on the notion of a 
collective Turkish identity, this doctrine was also a hybrid, a 
combination of Ottoman universalism and Western national-
ism.14 In these two viewpoints one may observe a critical tension 
between religious and ethnic appeals. Standing apart from these 
nominally "indigenous" orientations were a range of Western 
constructs from liberalism to social democracy .15 These doctrines 
were most often associated with Azerbaijan's minorities: Arme-
nians, Russians and Jews. 16 
This doctrinal diversity existed during that critical period 
between the decline of the Russian Empire and the consolidation 
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of Leninism. It was in the first eruption of Azeri "Civil Society", 
when nascent expressions of an Azerbaijani identity were made 
explicit through resistance to Russian authority, violence against 
the Armenian community, the appeals for sponsorship to the 
Great Powers and finally in the creation, in 1918, of the independ-
ent Azerbaijani Democratic Republic.17For two years the Azeris 
were and ethnic group, a nation, with a state, replet with a postage 
stamp, a flag, and diplomatic missions. Yet, it was a polity living 
on borrowed time. In 1920, the Bolsheviks moved to end the 
Republic and bring it once again under Moscow's control. 
"From today", Lenin told the non-Russians of the new 
USSR, "your beliefs and customs and your national and cultural 
institutions are declared free and inviolate. 18 Lenin's emphasis on 
national self-determination reflected his desire to, at once, destroy 
the Russian Empire and gain the fealty of the vast non Russian 
population. 19Ultimately, however, the logic of Leninism with its 
emphasis on class rather than national loyalties ran counter to the 
logic of ethnonationalism. 20 Furthermore, Azerbaijan's strategic 
location and oil wealth had, for Lenin, as it had for the Czars, the 
logic of Realpolitik. Thus, it was that in 1920 Lenin dispatched the 
troops to take Baku. 
The totalitarian implications of Lenin's polity had their 
grim enactment during the long Stalinist era. Azerbaijan was 
subject to the purges, terror, and genocide familiar to otherregions 
as well as to the systematic attempt to erase any sense of ethnic and 
religious distinctiveness. 21 The violence abated under Khrushchev 
and Brezhnev as Azerbaijan was subject to "socialist develop-
ment," the tangible result of which was the proliferation of local 
mafias as the terror-polity turned increasingly into, simply, a 
corrupt one.22 
Gorbachev has inherited this dubious legacy. By the time 
of his accession in 1985, it was evident that seven decades of 
Sovietism had not produced a socialist arcadia, an integrated state, 
a "new man" but, rather, intense ethnonationalist and religious 
resentment. Today, every corner of the USSR is animated by 
ethnic, nationalist and religious restlessness. 23 Nowhere has this 
tendency assumed more violent dimensions than in Azerbaijan. 24 
The salient events there are well known: a conflict between Azeris 
and Armenians over disputed territory initiated a cycle of violence 
which involved pogroms and population transfers. Demonstra-
tions occurred along the Iranian border with calls for "Greater 
Azerbaijan", widespread fighting in Azerbaijan and Armenia 
erupted resulting in the dispatch of Soviet troops to Baku which, 
in tum, instigated conflict in which both Azeris and Armenians 
were against Soviet authorities. By 1990 much of Azerbaijan had 
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reached the point of anarchy, representing for the USSR the 
greatest secession threat since 1918. 
The Return of Azerbaijani Civil Society? 
Whither Azerbaijan? It is not inevitable that a polity 
characterized by internal fragmentation or subject to arbitrary 
boundary division by stronger powers should become prey to 
violent ethnonationalism or intemporate irredentism. Such condi-
tions are known to states the world over. It is when these cleavages 
and divisions are politicized and made the basis of ideology, that 
tension and conflict become likely . Is a viable civil society, that 
constellation of human relationships standing between the indi-
vidual and the state, one which could serve, in conjunction with a 
disinterested form of rule, to put a break in ethnonationalist 
distemper likely to emerge in a post-Leninist Azerbaijan? 
There are few grounds for optimism. A stable civil 
society was unknown to the three historical legacies central to the 
political culture of modern Azerbaijan. The first was Islamic. 25 
Although tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities was an 
established principle of Ottoman rule, the traditional Islamic 
polity is, nevertheless, one which admits no independent, secular, 
society to exist. Only two political classes were recognized: ruler 
and ruled. 26The second was that of the Russian Empire. Here one 
may observe a case in which the state was stronger than the 
society, obviating until its last years the emergence of a civil 
society. 27 As it happened, however, this was eclipsed by Lenin-
ism, Azerbaijan's third great legacy. In the Leninist polity the 
society is dominated not only by the state, but by an ideologically 
defined party.28 The civil society emerging today in Azerbaijan 
has to work against this pedigree of intolerance, which affords 
Azeris little preparation for the management of ethnic, national 
and religious passions which characterize this fragmented region. 
The divisions are indeed pronounced. Religiously, Azer-
baijan is divided between Muslims, who constitute the vast 
majority, and other groups, notably Christians and Jews. 29 The 
Muslims are, in turn, split between the majoritarian Shi 'i and the 
Sunnis as well as by various Sufist orders. While no absolute 
correlation exists between sectarian affiliation and ideological 
conviction, it would seem that the Shi 'i reflect the traditionalist or 
populist Islamic orientation while the Sunnis have been particu-
larly receptive to Turkish nationalism. 30 Ethnically, Azerbaijan is 
host to a myriad of groups: Turks, Persians, Kurds, Armenians, 
Jews, Georgians and others. 31 Tensions between the Turkish 
Azeris who represent the majority and such rivals as the Armeni-
73 
ans whose numbers exist in large Azeri cities have often escalated 
to physical violence. Divisions exist also between urban and rural 
Azeris, modernized and traditional groups as well as between 
tribes and kinship groups. 
As in the Middle East several levels of loyalty identifica-
tion have vied for influence throughout the modem history of 
Azerbaijan. The first may be termed universalism, a "horizontal" 
loyalty focus, predicated on a transcending concept of religion or 
ethnicity. 32 Such a perspective is aloof to concerns for national 
boundaries and therefore runs counter to the logic of the modem 
state system . Though it has, in its many variants, enj oyed wide 
subscription, it has met with few tangible achievements. The 
second is nationalism, a "vertical" loyalty pattern based on a sense 
of distinct national identity. 33 This has, of course, been the 
predominant force in recent and contemporary International 
Relations. But, for those "nationalities" bereft of a state this 
nationalism represents a revolutionary force. It is presumably in 
this nationalist form that Azerbaijan's threat to secede from the 
USSR is the greatest. Yet, the prospects for this are undermined 
by the third level, that of "particularism". 34 This may be defined 
variously as subnationalism, tribalism religious or ethnic nation-
alism. Here, the basic sense of identity is defined very narrowly, 
whereby the interests of, for example, the tribe or clan are seen as 
paramount to national or universalist concerns. 35 It has been the 
case in several states, notably Iraq and Ethiopia, that members of 
small constituencies manage to assume power and seek to identify 
the state with their sect and orientation. Which tendency prevails 
currently in Azerbaijan is as yet unclear . One may only say that 
no consensus has been reached. Therefore, expectations of a 
coherent Azeri national assertion with a view toward secession 
should be tempered by an appreciation of the powerful subna-
tional forces loose in Azerbaijan. All of these tendencies compete 
in a profoundly different political environment from what had 
obtained only a few years ago. 
One may identify several phases to the creation of this new 
political environment in Azerbaijan. Begining in 1988 calls for 
greater cultural autonomy emerged. 36 This could have been viewed 
as a rejection ofRussification and Sovietization. It could also have 
been seen as the initiation of a new political discourse, taking the 
form, initially, of renewed interest in Azeri literature, linguistic. 
matters, hitherto forbidden historiographic debates, and greater 
freedom in Islamic activities. 37 In the next stage, evident in 1989, 
demands were heard for economic and political autonomy. 38 A 
sense of inequity, a feeling that the economic relations between 
Moscow and Baku were ostentatiously asymmetrical pervaded 
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Azeri oppositionist literature. 39 This notion of aggrievement ex-
tended also to the relations between Azeris and the Armenian and 
Russian minorities. 40 Protests were framed also in the idiom of 
environmentalism, reflecting the trend throughout the USSR.41 
Finally, by 1990 a new threshold had been achieved, the demand 
among some informal groups for national self determination. 42 
The existence of "informal" groups is, needless to say, 
quite foreign to Soviet history. The proliferation of these associa-
tions, estimated to number in the range of 30-60,000 represent a 
revolutionary development in domestic Soviet politics. 43 They 
reflect concomitantly the emergence of a nascent civil society, an 
embryonic multi-party system, and an instrument in Gorbachev' s 
perestroika strategy.44 In Azerbaijan a plethora of informal groups 
have emerged ranping from nationalist to environmentalist; Is-
lamic to cultural.4 
As the authority of the Republican Communist Party 
began to erode, the salient political force has become the Azer-
baijan Popular Front (APF).46 It surfaced in 1988, the creation of 
liberal, secular, Baku intellectuals. 47 As its initial statements 
revealed it was a reformist informal organization entirely suppor-
tive of perestroika. 48 Its leaders renounced the use of force as a 
legitimate means of expression and declared the APF's fealty to 
the themes of humanism, democracy, pluralism, internationalism, 
and human rights.49 "The goal of the PFA" one document reveals, 
"is legal government, a fully developed civil society and citizens 
enjoying all their rights and freedoms. "50 Most significantly there 
was no call for Azerbaijan's seccession from the USSR. 
However, by late 1989 it was evident that the APF had 
undergone fissions and radical transformations. This develop-
ment cannot be viewed apart from the atmosphere of acute 
conflict atmosphere which prevailed during this period. Further-
more, the fragmentation and radicalization of the APF is entirely 
consistent with the developmental pattern of other such enter-
prises. Having begun their careers as moderate, reformist move-
ments, groups such as the APF are liable to split into "moderate" 
and "radical" factions. It is, in short, likely that the APF now refers 
to a variety of ideological tendencies, ones which may harbour 
contempt for each other. 51 
For example one learns from Ebulfez Aliev, a leader of the 
APF, that the group's basic orientation is ethnic Turkism. "The 
objective," he states, "behind the establishment of the Popular 
Front of Azerbaijan is to secure full sovereignty and independence 
for Azerbaijan with a view to establishing the Turkish Republic of 
Democratic Azerbaijan." 52 This vision, Kemalist in nature does 
not, however, entail Azerbaijan's integration with Turkey. Ac-
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cording to Aliev: "Turkey's moral support will be enough for 
us. ,,53 
Others such as Gamid Kharishchi, an ideologue of the 
APF posits an Islamic vision. Rather than calling for secession, 
Kharishchi looks forward to the withdrawal of, for instance, the 
Balts, a move which would "intensify the Muslim influence in the 
Soviet Union. 54 "Yes," Khanshchi has stated, "there are elements 
of a jihad in our struggle. "55 His emphasis is on an Islamic 
resistance to the Soviet government raising the prospect that 
should the crunch come, support would be found in Iran, Turkey, 
and the entire Muslim world.56 To these ideological divergencies 
may be added, no doubt, many others. Ultimately though, the 
direction taken by the APF and other groups will be determined 
not only by the evolution of Azeri Civil Society but also by its 
emerging "conflict society". 
The Emergence of an Azerbaijani "Conflict Society" 
Has ethnonationalism in Azerbaijan reached a point of no 
return? Has the nascent and fragile civil society been eclipsed by 
one dominated by disturbance and conflict? The easing of Soviet 
control has set in motion powerful and unpredictable forces. 
Today Azerbaijan is host to the concommitantrise of ethnonation-
alist assertiveness and civil warfare, a combination which will 
have grave implications for the stability of the USSR and its 
southern neighbors. 
One may identify several sources of the emerging Azer-
baijani conflict society. The most conspicuous over the past 
several years has been the tension between Azeris and Armenians. 
This is an ancient animosity. 57 Spasms of violence between these 
communities punctuate the history of Transcaucasia. At one level 
it may be defined as a religious conflict among Muslim Azeris and 
Christian Armenians. 58 At another, it may be seen as a clash of two 
ethnic communities, made more pronounced by their having 
ideologized their identity in the form of nationalism. Here one 
encounters the great energizer of sub-nationalist agitation: the 
nationalist assertion that humanity is naturally divided into na-
tions and each is entitled to the realization of territorial sover-
eignty.59 Such doctrinal stridency can only exacerbate relations 
between groups making coexistence problematic as each is driven 
by ideology, to define the legitimacy of the state in terms of its 
ethnic or national identity. No doubt, the animosity felt between 
Azeris and Armenians has been manipulated by Soviet authori-
ties.60 As it happens, the Azeris have long considered the Arme-
nians in their midst to be "collaborators" with Moscow and a 
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group which enjoyed a disproportionate measure of influence in 
Azerbaijan. 61 
The focus of the recent distemper between these commu-
nities has been over the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autono-
mous Oblast [NKAO]. This is a densly populated mountainous 
enclave, demographically dominated by Armenians with a siz-
able Azeri minority. 62 Nevertheless, it rests geographically in the 
Azerbaijani SSR. During the 1920' s, the decision was made by the 
Soviet rulers, to place the NKAO under the jurisdiction of Baku. 63 
In so doing, the regime ensured that between the Armenians, who 
have never ceased demanding the return of the NKAO and the 
Azeris who jealously guard their constitutional claims, there 
would be a structural and self-perpetuating source of discord. This 
tension was masked during the long decades of Sovietism. But 
with the advent of perestroika and the return of civil society in the 
USSR the debate over the NKAO resurfaced with a vengance. 
The first move issued from Armenia. Armenian intellec-
tuals were among the first to mobilize in the more relaxed 
Gorbachev era.64 Almost immediately the NKAO issue moved to 
the forefront of the Armenian agenda. In 1988 a delegation of 
Armenian intellectuals met with Gorbachev and his associates in 
Moscow. 65 It was their hope that the Soviet authorities would 
agree to a change in the NKAO's status. Having initially been 
given encouragement in their pleadings, the Armenians moved 
boldly in mobilizing popular s~port for this initiative in the 
NKAO and throughout Armenia. The Azeri reaction was imme-
diate and violent. Armenians were attacked in the NKAO, Baku 
and in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait. 67 
Attempts to assign culpability seem pointless: the Arme-
nians were playing with fire, provoking a predictable reaction. 
Analogically one may point to the agitations of the Zionists in 
Baghdad during the 1930's and 1940's and the Muslim, Arab 
response. As was the case with the Jews of Baghdad, the minority 
status of the Armenians in Azerbaijan meant that to pose a 
nationalist challenge to the majority was to illicit hostility albeit 
one given martial expression in vastly asymmetrical terms. 68 
Caught in the crossfire of clashing nationalist messianisms the 
Armenians in Azerbaijan and the Azeris in Armenia were forced 
to take flight as intercommunal violence spread through the 
region. 69 
For its part, the Soviet authorities, declared finally that 
they would not look with favor upon the Armenian request. "The 
frontiers of Armenia and Azerbaijan," Alexandr Y akovlev averred, 
"are not to be touched." 70 However, the matter would not end 
there. Violent forces had been loosed upon the area, creating a 
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logic and momentum of their own. 
From 1988 through 1990 the conflict intensified and 
spread out from the NKAO to prevade both Azerbaijan and 
Armenia. The Soviets attempted first to put the NKAO under its 
direct control then sacked local party cadres only to see their 
replacements identify themselves with Republican rather than 
Soviet loyalties.71Durinf2 this period the APF instituted strikes and 
blockades on Armenia. 2 Both Azeri and Armenian armed groups 
roamed the cities and countryside. 73 Intercommunal tension had 
escalated to the point of civil war. 
By 1990 the conflict environment was informed by an 
additional element as clashes developed between Soviet forces 
and Azeri irregulars. 74 In January 1990 numerous Azeris from the 
Nakhichevan demonstrated along the Soviet-Iranian border. 75 
The demonstrators, many of whom evinced sympathy with Iran's 
Islamic Revolution demanded the ability to visit co-religionists 
across the Arax River in Iranian Azerbaijan. 76 A cardinal Soviet 
concern was exposed as calls were heard for the reunification of 
Azerbaijan and the creation of "Greater Azerbaijan". 77 For dec-
ades the USSR had attempted to exploit Azerbaijan's division in 
order to destabilize Iran.7 Now, conceivably it is Iran's opportu-
nity to reverse this pattern. To this prospect was added the tangible 
reality of the APF's assertiveness, one which culminated in its 
assumption of power in such towns as Lenkoran. 79 It was amid 
these developments that the Soviet authorities were provided the 
pretext to send in the troops. 
The conflict is now a triangular one between Azerbaijani, 
Armenian, and Soviet forces. It has been argued that what obtains 
now are wars of "national liberation" as both Azeri and Armenian 
groups openly resist Soviet control. 80 Mention is made in this 
regard of the Armenian denunciation of the Soviet invasion of 
Baku. 81 Mention is made also of the secessionist activities under-
way in Nakhichevan, an Azeri enclave situated in Armenia. 82 
Whether or not the axis of conflict has shifted from an inter ethnic 
one to an "anti-colonial" struggle, there may be no question that 
the disturbences in Azerbaijan are formidable. "Yes," a Soviet 
commentator reported to his Moscow audience, "one can say this 
is a real war." 83 
Dissent has, indeed, emerged in Moscow over what is seen 
as a "second Afghanistan. "84 The analogy is imperfect. Yet, as in 
Afghanistan, the war in Transcaucasia has involved an array of 
weapons and modes of engagement. 85 Questions have been raised 
regarding the sources of Azeri and Armenian weaponry. 86 Of 
course, it has also been speculated that the conflict is being 
manipulated and exaggerated by the Soviet authorities as an 
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element of Gorbachev's consolidation strategy. 87 All that may be 
safely said is that the conflict environment in Azerbaijan is 
extremely fluid. In such an atmosphere, masses which are disori-
ented, fearful and enraged may with equal probability lay passive 
or be strirred into violent frenzy on behalf of some Messianism, 
be it nationalist, ethnic, or religious. 
The war in Azerbaijan throws into sharp relief a poten-
tially new factor in Soviet domestic politics: the proliferation of 
revolutionary terrorism. There is about this possibility a great 
irony. Having for years been supportive of terrorism directed 
against the West, the USSR now stands vulnerable before this 
vexing form of political violence. 88 This vulnerability may be seen 
in several ways. There is first the dilemma of rising political 
expectations. These expectations increase as the totalitarian power 
structure withers. However, ambitions are ultimately frustrated 
by the dearth of sanctioned institutions by which they might be 
satisfied. Such a condition may prompt groups working against 
the system or toward its destruction to seek to do so through extra-
legal means. As it happens, many of the new formations in the 
USSR are defined in terms of ethnonationalism, reflecting a 
second source of vulnerability; internal ethnic fragmentation. 89 
Having failed to overcome these divisions the Soviet leadership 
has by its de-emphasis on Marxist-Leninism, removed the system's 
sole transcending, concept of legitimacy. 90 The USSR is now 
bereft of such an integrative vision.Upon what principle then may 
Moscow's hegemony over Baku or Tiblisi be justified? For the 
myriad of ethnonationalist groups emerging across the USSR the 
answer is by no means obvious. Many may resort to terrorist 
activity, 91 a trend symbolic of a third factor, the "radicalization 
dynamic". Quite rapidly a dichotomy could emerge within many 
of th~se groups, between "moderates" and "radicals", one which 
generally devolves into a division between "compromisers" and 
"purists". 92 Unable to out-promise, to speak in terms of absolutes, 
constrained by position or temperament, the moderate is fre-
quently overwhelmed by the radical whose message, undiluted by 
nuance involves a devastating critique of the movement's "mod-
erate leadership" and a compelling argument that through the 
agency of political violence the ideological vision may be real-
ised. The sanguine histones of countless ethnonationalist associa-
tions the world over speak directly to this theme. And, to be sure, 
the radicalization of groups within the USSR may well put them 
in league with extra-regional terrorist organizations. It is this 
paradox of interdependence which represents a fourth vulnerabil-
ity for the USSR. So central to Gorbachev's reform strategy, 
interdependence means opening the USSR to foreign influences 
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and interactions. 93 No doubt he would prefer selective interde-
pendence. Yet, this is not a process susceptible to rigid control. It 
is one which may have the unintended consequence of permitting 
cooperation between terrorist organizations in the USSR and 
abroad. 94 Nowhere is the threat of such linkages more tangible 
than in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Terrorism has indeed 
arrived in the Soviet Union, a factor which will vastly complicate 
the development of an Azeri civil society and contribute to the 
escalation of ethnonationalist violence in the region. 
But, what are the prospects that Azerbaijan might actually 
secede form the USSR? Will the dynamics of these violent trends 
lead inevitably to the creation of an independent Azerbaijan? 
When all is said and done the answer is to be found not in Baku but 
in Moscow. The historical lesson of the de-colonization of Asia 
and Africa was not the efficacy or allure of national liberation 
movements but rather the equivocation, self doubt, and resigna-
tion in the metropole. 95 This and a revised conception of the 
USSR's national interest help explain the startling case with 
which the countries of Eastern Europe broke from Soviet domina-
tion.96 An independent Azerbaijan would be the outcome of 
decisions taken by Gorbachev and his associates. Thus, the issue 
is purely one of speculation. Anything is possible: secession, 
autonomy, the status quo even protracted civil war and fragmen-
tation. 
The International Politics of Azerbaijan Ethnonationalism 
Who speaks for Baku? It can no longer be said that its fate, 
its relations with the outside world are determined exclusively by 
Soviet authorities. 97 Indeed, not since 1918 have stirrings in 
Azerbaijan had such direct implications for International Rela-
tions. The most immediate affects relate directly to the interna-
tional position and credibility of the USSR. Here one may observe 
an intimate connection between subnationalist challenges and 
International Relations ramifications. 
For the USSR, Azerbaijan's assertiveness symbolizes the 
general crisis of the Soviet system. The spectical of civil war in 
Transcaucasia must raise doubts regarding the stability and long 
term viability of the Soviet order. It must also underscore concerns 
that Gorbachev's revitalization strategy is plagued by insur-
mountable contradictions and must lead ultimately to ethnona-
tionalist implosion. Such an interpretation, correct or spurious, 
cannot reflect beneficially on the USSR's international authority 
and credibility, the currency of world politics. 
This credibility may be undermined in another fashion. It 
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is with some trepidation that much of the Muslim world views 
Gorbachev's reorientation of Soviet foreign policy. In one sense 
the USSR 's "New Thinking" entails forging alliances with a vast 
international constituency on the basis of shared fealty to "global 
human values" and the dynamics of interdependence. 98 Yet, in 
another sense it means joining the USSR to the West creating a 
Western monolith from San Francisco to Vladivostok or a Com-
mon European Home. From the Muslim perspective this is a house 
without any Islamic wings. It is, moreover, seen as representing 
but another chapter in the long struggle between the realms of 
Christendom and Islam. It is reported that, alarmed at such a 
development, the Ayatollah Khomeyni once warned Gorbachev 
"not to fall into the embrace of the West." 99 
Iran has, to be sure, pointed to what it views as an 
asymmetrical Soviet and Western response to the concomitant 
crises in the Baltics and Transcaucasia. "You travelled to Lithu-
ania to negotiate," an Iranian commentator said of Gorbachev's 
exertions, "but in Azerbaijan you simply issued the order for 
massacre." 100 For Iran and other forces in the Middle East, Soviet 
behavior in Azerbaijan and the muted Western reaction to these 
actions symbolized a conspiracy visited upon Azeri Muslims. 101 
Regardless of the merits of such an interpretation, should the 
USSR be commonly identified as part of this Western conspiracy, 
colonizing and oppressing Muslims, new complications may 
attend its relations with remaining Third World radical regimes. 
For its part Iran must view the rise of Azeri ethnonation-
alism with caution. Demands for the creation of a "Greater 
Azerbaijan" involving the Union of Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan 
represent challenge to Iran's territorial integrity. 102 Such a trend 
would also upset relations internally between ethnic Iranians and 
Azeris. Furthermore, it can only be with trepidation that Iran faces 
the prospect of a United Azerbaijan, 15 million strong, possessing 
a Caspian Seaboard and oil wealth, placed in its northern frontier. 
This possibility is made more menacing by the realization that 
such an entity might define itself not in terms of Shi' i fundamen-
talism but, rather, Turkish nationalism. 103 But, most immediately, 
the Iranian government faces the prospect that, in their conflict 
with Moscow, Soviet Azeris will take flight across the Iranian 
border in search of sanctuary thereby providing the Soviet au-
thorities with a pretext for incursions into Iran. 104 As was seen in 
the Jordanian Crsis of 1970 the agitations of a subnationalist 
movement may result in interstate tension with both regional and 
international ramifications. 
Despite such concerns the possibility may not be dis-
counted that Iran will pursue an activist policy toward Soviet 
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Azerbaijan. It is the case that Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, Iran's Prime 
Minister declared that his government would not "align itself with 
those who advocate the 9i sin tegration of the USSR. " 105 However, 
demands for a revolutionary approach have surfaced. 106 Although 
Iran's revolution has been delivered formidable blows at home 
and abroad it may yet serve as a source of cooperation, inspira-
tional or tangible, for Muslim activists in Azerbaijan and Central 
Asia. 107 Iran's Islamic message represents a coherent alternative 
to the ideolorical and political ambiguity that now prevails in 
Azerbaijan. 10 Moreover, should Moscow's grip weaken Iran's 
interest in the future orientation towards Azerbaijan would un-
doubtedly be keen. 
Turkey's interest would also be aroused. Historical ties, 
ethnic affinities, and concerns lest the Armenians become em-
boldened, have drawn Turkey back to the center of events in 
Transcaucasia. 109 The rise of Azeri ethnonationalism underscores 
a great opportunity for Turkey as it presents itself as the leader of 
the US SR' s vast Turkic population. "In the near future," a Turkish 
official remarked, "we shall see the flags of Turkic governments 
in Russia. " 110 The Turkish assertion is a formidable one, based on 
the appeal of Turkish nationalism and the vision of Turkey as a 
gateway to the West and a source of economic viability. 1u In this 
sense, Iran's Islamic vision of a post Soviet Azerbaijan is matched 
by a Turkish nationalist conception. 
Could it be that somewhere a Turkish Sykes and Iranian 
Picot conspire to divide the spoils of the post Communist Tran-
scaucasia and Central Asia? It is more like I y that between Moscow, 
Ankara, and Tehran a tacit understanding exists that ethno-
nationalist irredentism is to be discouraged. Should this be the 
case the Azeris will join the Kurds and Armenians as nations 
without states, continuing sources of regional tension. 
Conclusion 
What judgments may be made from this examination of 
Azerbaijan's resurgent ethnonationalism? Whether or not one 
views the disturbances in Azerbaijan as symbolic of the USSR 's 
terminal crisis there can be no denying that powerful subnational 
forces have been unleashed, ones which may prove to be beyond 
the total control of central authorities despite the regime's pattern 
of violent crackdown on independence tendencies in Transcauca-
sia and the Bal tics. Nevertheless, the history and political culture 
of Azerbaijan provides little basis for optimism that the Republic's 
post-Soviet experience will be stable and peaceful. Moreover, the 
depth of animosity between Azeris and Armenians is likely to 
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provide the region with an ongoing source of tension. This discord 
will most probably provide other Soviet Republics and neighbor-
ing states with opportunities to seek advantage. Transcaucasia is 
thus likely to remain a zone of international conflict, a theatre of 
subnational and interstate rivalry . 
One might point also to conclusions of a more general 
nature. What is the relationship between ethnonationalism and 
International Relations? Despite the sound and fury associated 
with subnationalist movements world wide, it is the state which 
dominates the international system. The state has not always been 
paramount. Before the advent of the European state system , 
various aggregations prevailed. But since then, it has been the 
nation state which has endured and dominated : endured for fear 
that its sequel would be anarchy, dominated because of the 
alacrity with which it has destroyed its challengers , universalistic 
or particularistic. 
It may be argued that those states that did not emerge out 
of this European tradition are the artificial contrivances of impe-
rialism. To this it must be said that all states are artificial and 
contrived, all the outcome of violence and chance. But regardless 
of their pedigree or orientation, the modern nation state has 
betrayed a persistent intolerance toward sub-nationalist revision-
ism. During the century this intolerance has assumed a variety of 
expressions, from mild discrimination to genocide. Countries as 
disparate as Great Britain and India, Israel and Iraq, Spain and 
Nigeria are shown to be quite similar in their aversion to ethnona-
tionalist irredentism. The actions of the Soviet authorities in the 
Bal tics at the begining of 1991 suggest that the experience of the 
U.S.S.R . is consistent with the general pattern. 
Ethnonationalism coexists uneasily with the state-system. 
At once it serves as a potential physical challenge for territory, a 
central factor in a state's internal and external affairs, a challenge 
to the legitimacy upon which a state may rest, and a force to be 
manipulated in one country ' s foreign policy toward another. It 
remains among the most powerful sources of disturbance to the 
international structure. 
What of the "new world order' said to be arising out of the 
Cold War's demise? Hitherto most speculations on this question 
have had as their analytical point of departure the likelihood of a 
new international consensus expressed through novel forms of 
cooperation, resting on new forms of intellectual convergence and 
political integration .112 Gone, according to this view , are the great 
ideological conflicts and bloc antagonisms. Now, the advocates of 
a Lockean new world order assert, a system of order and comity 
is at last within sight. But could not Azerbaijan's recent experi-
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ence suggest that to entertain such melioristic notions is to invest 
in the process of political change unwarranted hopes and expec-
tations? Is it, perhaps, not more prudent to suppose that great 
changes, however desirable, must, as a matter of course, occasion 
new and unforeseen disturbances as groups continue as they 
always have to seek influence, power, advantage, and to sustain 
differences among themselves? 
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